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The Apparent Consistency of Religion Clause
Doctrine
Abner S. Greene*

I. INTRODUCTION
A hallmark of religion clause scholarship is the complaint that the
doctrine is a hopeless muddle. However, the Rehnquist Court brought
a considerable amount of consistency-well, apparent consistencyto the doctrine. I say "apparent consistency" because, just as a
paradox is only a seeming contradiction, so was the Rehnquist
Court's religion clause jurisprudence only seemingly consistent. The
doctrine focuses on whether the government singles out religion for
special benefit (generally problematic under the Establishment
Clause) or for special burden (generally problematic under the Free
Exercise Clause). If, on the other hand, the government benefits
religion as part of a more general category of benefits, or burdens
religion as part of a more general category of burdens, neither clause
is violated. Thus, religion clause doctrine seemingly fits together
nicely, tracking a more general development in equality
jurisprudence.' However, there are some outlier cases in which the
Rehnquist Court upheld special benefits for or special burdens on
religion. These outlier cases are a window into a deeper inconsistency
in religion clause doctrine. The outlier cases-and a proper
understanding of why and when the Court views religion as
foregrounded, rather than backgrounded, in Establishment Clause
cases-remind us of the ways in which religion is distinctive. That
* Fordham University School of Law.
1. See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW & RELIGION: A
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 226, 228-29 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); see also Noah Feldman,
From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV.
673, 702 (2002) (connecting the rise of the endorsement test to the development of political
equality as a constitutional value).
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distinctiveness is not properly valued by a formal doctrine that
matches general benefits (valid) against general burdens (valid), and
special benefits (invalid) against special burdens (invalid). What we
take away from religion by the cases that invalidate religion-favoring
governmental action is not offset by those that invalidate religiondisfavoring governmental action. We need a broader conception of
free exercise to compensate for the ways in which the doctrine
(properly, in my judgment) treats religion as distinctive under the
Establishment Clause.
This argument can be better understood by considering that the
cornerstone of the Rehnquist Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence was Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, which
focuses on whether government action would be perceived by a
reasonable observer as endorsing religion or a particular religion, i.e.,
whether it would be perceived as advancing a contested view of
religious truth. 2 Such endorsement makes non-adherents to the
government's position feel excluded as second-class citizens, unable
to share the dominant doctrinal perspective and therefore shut out
from full citizenship. Justice O'Connor never fully explained how
government endorsement of religion works this harm, but here is one
version of the argument: If the government endorses a contested
version of religious truth and religion is generally understood to
speak to ultimate, foundational truths,3 those who do not share the
government's perspective will reasonably feel disconnected from this
truth (one type of harm) or from a full ability to influence the actions
of their governmental agents (another type of harm). This is
especially so because religion involves the belief in an extra-human
source of normative authority, and reference to such authority in the
governmental arena excludes non-believers from an equal ability to
participate. 4 These are powerful concerns, and the Court has
2. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773-74 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627-32 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
3. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose,88 VA. L. REV. 87, 90 (2002).
4. See Greene, supra note 1, at 230-34; Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A
Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535 [hereinafter Greene, Is Religion Special?];
Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1614-25
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appropriately invalidated laws that raise them. The Rehnquist Court's
key contribution to Free Exercise Clause doctrine-its refusal to
recognize a free exercise problem with laws that burden religion as
part of a general category of burdened activity-appears to match its
practice of upholding laws that benefit religion as part of a general
category of benefited activity against Establishment Clause
challenge. However, this weakened Free Exercise Clause is not the
appropriate fit for an Establishment Clause that invalidates laws that
harm one's ability to participate as a full citizen.5 Such doctrine
works a corresponding harm on those who would use the government
to openly advance what they believe to be the ultimate, foundational
truth, based in religion. The partial gag rule on religious speech
resulting from an Establishment Clause doctrine that appropriately
limits the role of the government in advancing religious ideas is not
sufficiently remedied by a Free Exercise Clause doctrine that merely
attends to intentional discrimination against religion. A more robust
system of exemptions (and accommodations) is needed.6

(1993) [hereinafter Greene, Political Balance]; see also Abner S. Greene, Constitutional
Reductionism, Rawls, and the Religion Clauses, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2089, 2096-98 (2004)
[hereinafter Greene, Constitutional Reductionism]; Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground. A
Review ofPOLITICAL LIBERALISM by John Rawls and LIFE'S DOMINION by Ronald Dworkin, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 657-66 (1994) [hereinafter Greene, Uncommon Ground]; cf
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1546-49 (2000) (discussing the expressive theory of

Establishment Clause harm).
5. See Greene, supra note 1, at 234-38; Greene, Political Balance, supra note 4, at
1633-40; see also Greene, Constitutional Reductionism, supra note 4, at 2098-103; Greene,
Uncommon Ground,supra note 4, at 666-73.
6. To her credit, Justice O'Connor understood this-in addition to developing and
applying the endorsement test, she supported the view that the Free Exercise Clause sometimes

requires exemptions, even from generally applicable laws. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 892-903 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter also
appears to share this set of views. See infra text accompanying notes 92-96, 144. For other
views agreeing that formal equality fails to capture the way in which the religion clauses treat
religion as distinctive, but without sharing my argument for a "political balance" to limit the
role of expressly religious argumentation in lawmaking, offset by a robust system of judicial
exemptions for religious practice, see Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A
Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433, 447 (1995); Michael
W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3, 11 (2000).
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II. THE APPARENTLY CONSISTENT DOCTRINE
If we focus, at least at first glance, on the generality/specificity
criterion, the doctrine is surprisingly consistent. The main Rehnquist
Court development for both religion clauses was to ascertain whether
the law in question backgrounded or foregrounded religion.
Backgrounding means that the government does not single out
religion, and therefore its actions are constitutional; foregrounding
means the opposite. Under one view of neutrality (and there are
many), this is precisely the correct focus. Under this view-what one
might call formal neutrality 7-the political branches and the judiciary
can best stay out of the way of religion by following a clear rule of
formal equal treatment.8 This theory is not the best for protecting
minority religions, however, and this should give us initial pause as
to whether generality (i.e., formal neutrality) really captures a core
concern of the religion clauses. 9 Majorities will find it easy to include
religious recipients in a larger class of beneficiaries-for example, a
school vouchers program would likely not be enacted unless
mainstream religious groups were supportive and significant
beneficiaries. Also, when laws only incidentally burden religion, it is
minorities, not majorities, who are most likely to be harmed because
the regulated practices will rarely be those the majority religion holds
7. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1961).
8. Another version of neutrality-what we might call "substantive neutrality"--argues
that government preserves religious freedom best by providing neither an incentive nor a
deterrent to religious belief or practice. See Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 694, 732 (1997); Berg, supra note 6, at 451; Douglas Laycock,
Theology Scholarships, the Pledge ofAllegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes
but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 156, 243 (2004); Michael W. McConnell &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments
Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 643; McConnell,
supra note 6, at 38. This view looks beneath the formal surface of the government's action to its
effects.
9. See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
919 (2004). For another critique of the formal neutrality (or equality) view, see Steven H.
Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundationsof the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9 (2004)
(arguing that formal equality cannot fully explain the doctrine because many values underlie
both religion clauses).
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dear. 10 Under the formal neutrality view, neither action-religious
benefits that happen to offer significant help for religious majorities
(as part of a secular plus religious beneficiary group and without
formally excluding religious minorities), or religious burdens that
happen to significantly burden religious minorities (as incidental
burdens from generally applicable laws, thereby formally burdening
both religious and secular practice and both majority and minority
religions)-is uncof-stitutional.
A. EstablishmentClause: ConstitutionalBecause Partof a General
Package
On the Establishment Clause side, the Rehnquist Court built on
earlier opinions and developed the focus on whether benefits to
religion are part of a more general benefits program. Mueller v.
Allen" and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind 12 already started in this direction, but the Rehnquist Court
cemented generality as the key to upholding benefits programs in
14
Bowen v. Kendrick, 13 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
Agostini v. Felton,15 Mitchell v. Helms, 16 and Zelman v. SimmonsHarris.7
Kendrick upheld the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) against
a facial constitutional challenge. 18 The AFLA provided federal grants
"to public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies 'for services
and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and
10. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1133-36 (1990). But cf Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1542-44 (1999) (approving of laws that
incidentally burden minority religions more than majority religions). Majorities will, though,
sometimes burden majoritarian religious practice as part of a general law not directed at
religion; this possibility becomes important for my "political balance" argument, as sketched
below, see infra text accompanying note 179, and as detailed by Greene, supra note 1,at 23537; Greene, PoliticalBalance,supra note 4, at 1636-39.
11. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
12. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
13. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
14. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
15. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
16. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
17. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
18. See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 589.
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pregnancy." ' 19 The focus of the case was on abstinence-centered
education services. Recipients expressly included religious
organizations, as part of a wider ambit of public and private
recipients.20 Although leaving open the possibility of as-applied
challenges to the use of such funds to advance religious doctrine
regarding sexual behavior, 21 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that "nothing on the face of the [AFLA] suggests it is
anything but neutral with respect
22 to the grantee's status as a sectarian
or purely secular institution.,
Zobrest upheld the provision of a sign-language interpreter to
accompany a deaf student to classes in a Roman Catholic high
school.23 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
requires public and private (secular and religious) schools to provide
such assistance. The Court held, in another opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, that "[t]he service at issue in this case is part of a general
government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child
qualifying as 'handicapped' under the IDEA, without regard to the
'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the
child attends." 24 As an additional factor supporting the formal
neutrality of the governmental aid, the IDEA accords "parents
freedom to select a school of their choice., 25 Thus, the benefits are
available generally, and whether they are used in a religious school
depends on parental choice.
Aguilar v. Felton26 involved a challenge to federal Title I funds,
which go to public or private schools to support children who need
remedial education, guidance, and job counseling. Although the law
requires that the provided services be secular, New York City
provided services at private schools, including religious schools,
because of difficulties in providing services to private school children
at public schools. The Court invalidated this practice, but it later
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 593 (quoting S.REP. No. 97-161, at 1 (1981)).
See id.at 604-05.
See id. at 618-22; see also id. at 622-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 608 (majority opinion).
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993).
Id. at 10.
Id.
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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overruled Aguilar in Agostini.27 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, explained that the Court over the years had "abandoned the
presumption.., that the placement of public employees on parochial
school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of statesponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between
government and religion." 28 Direct governmental aid to the
educational function of religious schools was not invalid because the
aid was given generally to underprivileged students, and the only
reason it reached parochial schools was that the parents chose to send
29
their children there rather than to public or secular, private schools.
According to the Court, such an aid program provides no incentive to
"undertake religious indoctrination," because the "aid is allocated on
the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor
religion, and is made available to both religious and secular
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. 30
The focus on the generality of the funding program was front and
center in Mitchell v. Helms, 31 in which a plurality asserted that
generality is sufficient to uphold such programs. Federal Chapter
Two funds go to state and local government agencies for use in
lending secular educational materials and equipment to public and
private schools.32 The Mitchell Court upheld this arrangement as
applied to loans to private, religious schools. In so doing, the Court
overruled precedent invalidating similar programs based on the risk
that public funds would be diverted to religious use.33 Although a
majority reached this conclusion, the plurality, per Justice Thomas,
focused on "the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered
to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their
religion." 34 Private parental choice as to where to educate their
children provides a means of "assuring neutrality. 35 Justice

27. Id., overruledby Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
28. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223.

29. See id. at 225-26, 228.
30. Id. at 231.
31.
32.
33.

530 U.S. 793 (2000).
See id. at 801-02.
See id. at 808, 835 (overruling Meek v. Pittenger,421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v.

Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)); see also id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
34. Id. at 809 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 829.
35. Id. at 810; see also id. at 829.
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O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice
Breyer, refused to accept either neutrality or generality as dispositive
in cases such as this; the three dissenters agreed with O'Connor on
this point.3 6 One should note, however, that Justice O'Connor never
voted to invalidate a governmental funding program that provides
support to religious schools as part of a larger category of schools.
The most recent-and arguably most important 37-- of the cases
involving public funds running to religious schools is Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.38 Ohio enacted the Pilot Project Scholarship
Program, which provided tuition aid for students in kindergarten
through eighth grade for use in secular or religious private schools in
a school district under state control pursuant to a federal court order;
Cleveland was the only such district. The aid could also be used in
any public school in an adjacent school district. The Program also
provided tutorial aid, in significantly lower amounts than the tuition
aid, for use in public schools in a district under court order. 39 In
determining the appropriate level of generality for examining the
Program, the Court looked to other Ohio programs that help
Cleveland's school children. The Court concluded that, following
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, "the program challenged here is a
program of true private choice," and that it is "neutral in all respects
toward religion" because it is "part of a general and multifaceted
undertaking by the State of Ohio to provide educational opportunities
to the children of a failed school district., 40 Justice O'Connor's
concurrence-providing the fifth vote for Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion-elaborated on the appropriate level of generality,
supporting the Court's "conclusion that this inquiry should consider
all reasonable educational alternatives to religious schools that are
available to parents. 4 1
The caselaw in this area leaves open as-applied challenges to the
provision of public funds for religious indoctrination in religious
36. See id. at 837-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 878-84 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
37. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 167.
38. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
39. For a description of the facts, see id. at 644-48.
40. Id. at 653.
41. Id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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schools or for social service programs run by religious institutions.
Justice O'Connor, in particular, insisted that these challenges remain
42
open; this was key to her Kendrick and Mitchell concurrences.
Although the aid is part of a general program that includes secular
and religious recipients and it is, on its face, secular, any religious use
of such aid would nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause's
proscription against governmental religious indoctrination. But
Zelman-and Mueller and Witters before it 43-involved public funds
flowing to both the secular and religious aspects of private, religious
school education. So why do such funds not violate Justice
O'Connor's Kendrick/Mitchell insistence against as-applied uses of
otherwise general funds for religious indoctrination? This is where
the parental choice aspect comes into play-the public funds in this
trio of cases went to religious schools only because of parental
choice, which could also channel the funds to non-religious schools.
It's not clear how important the direct/indirect line is here-i.e.,
whether it matters that funds first pass through the parents' hands,
and then benefit the schools. What is important is that the parental
choice cuts the chain of causation, as it were, between the
government's funds and the religious school's ability to convey
religious teachings. This is why Justice O'Connor can say, in
Mitchell, that even a general, neutral government funding program
would be invalid if the funds are paid on a per capita basis from the
government coffers to the schools without intervening parental choice
directing the funds to one place or another. Such an arrangement
raises endorsement concerns, says Justice O'Connor. 4 If this

42. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840-41, 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622-24 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997); Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 618-22.
43. Zobrest is often mentioned as part of this group, and indeed the sign language

interpreter did interpret religion classes as well as secular classes; however, arguably this is not
use of government funds for religious indoctrination because the sign language interpreter just
conveyed what he was hearing. The money made available through the programs in Mueller,
Witters, and Zelman was used by religious institutions to convey, inter alia, their religious

doctrine because it is what they want to inculcate; the sign language interpreter, strictly
speaking, wanted to inculcate nothing. Whether Zobrest is or is not properly grouped with these

other cases is not, however, a matter of great importance.
44. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV.
1071, 1096 (2002); Laycock, supra note 8, at 166, 181.
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distinction holds, it is again because we have reconfigured the
appropriate level of generality-we see a general funding program
when parents are choosers, whereas we see government sponsorship
of religious indoctrination when the government pays per capita
funds, even if such funds go to both religious and non-religious
schools. For purposes of my argument in this Article, whether this
distinction is analytically satisfying is less important than what it says
about the Court's lingering concern over the perception that
government is going beyond helping an array of children obtain a
quality education (permissible), and instead is seeking to advance
religious ideas (impermissible). This end is precisely what the Court
deems the Establishment Clause to forbid in the cases that invalidated
laws as insufficiently general. Also, this central concern of the
Rehnquist Court-e.g., with laws that place or appear to place the
government's imprimatur behind religious doctrine-helps reveal
why the Court's apparently parallel Free Exercise Clause doctrine,
which also focuses on whether laws affect religion as part of a
general package or in a more targeted fashion, in fact fails to match
properly with the way in which its Establishment Clause doctrine
limits the role of government in advancing religion.
In addition to the parochial school funding cases, the Rehnquist
Court also held that the government may provide either space or
funds to religious speakers without violating the Establishment
Clause, so long as the space or funds are provided more generally as
well. The Rehnquist Court cases in this line 45 were Board of
Education v. Mergens,46 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District,47 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors,48 and
Good News Club v. Milford Central School.49 These cases began as
Free Speech Clause cases; 50 the Court held that once the government
has created a forum for private speech and defined it sufficiently
45. The key pre-Rehnquist Court case in this line is Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981).
46. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
47. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
48. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
49. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
50. Except Mergens, which held that a federal statute required equal access for religious
groups to school facilities during non-instructional time. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 234-37.
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generally, it may not exclude religious speech because doing so
would constitute discrimination based on speech content. Such
discrimination is permissible only if it is supported by a compelling
state interest; in these cases, the Court rejected the argument that the
government has a compelling interest in avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation. The Court reasoned that providing space or funds
for religious or secular speech on an equal basis does not show
governmental favoritism toward religion. Instead, it shows that the
government plays by basic Free Speech Clause public forum rules.
The generality of the benefit was key to these outcomes.51
One hard question posed by these cases is whether the
government may define a speech forum (either space or funding)
sufficiently narrowly so as to properly exclude religious speech. It's
one thing for the government to open an auditorium for speech,
subject only to content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions-in
this situation, there's no good reason to exclude religious speech,
unless the Establishment Clause absolutely prohibits the use of
government facilities or funds for religious speech. But it's another
thing for the government to fund only student publications regarding
(for example) music, art, sports, and the like, but to exclude political
and religious publications 52 on the ground that such funding would
entangle the government in partisan/sectarian controversies it wishes
to avoid. The Rehnquist Court, however, did not distinguish the truly
open public forum from the more limited forum; in both instances,
51. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114 ("The Good News Club seeks nothing more
than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other
groups."); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 ("The governmental program here is neutral toward
religion."); id at 847 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting "neutrality" and "generally applicable
program"); id. at 850 (noting that "widely divergent viewpoints" of the various funded student
publications make "improbable any perception of government endorsement of the relieious
message"); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 ("The District property has repeatedly been used by
a wide variety of private organizations. Under these circumstances,... there would have been
no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or
any particular creed .... ); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion) ("[M]essage is one of
neutrality rather than endorsement .... ); id. at 250 (noting that "secondary school students are
mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student
speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis"); id. at 252 (noting the "broad
spectrum of officially recognized student clubs"); id. ("To the extent that a religious club is
merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs, students should perceive no
message of government endorsement of religion.").
52. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 825.
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the government may not exclude religious
speech, and the
53
Establishment Clause is no bar to its inclusion.
Finally, the Rehnquist Court5 4 twice upheld government religious
displays as not unconstitutionally endorsing religion on the ground
that the display would be perceived by a reasonable observer as part
of a larger package of displays, and therefore that the religious
message would be backgrounded, rather than foregrounded. 55 In
County of Allegheny v. ACL U, 56 the Court upheld the display of a
Chanukah menorah "placed just outside the City-County Building,
next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. ' ' 57 Four Justices
would have adopted an approach that would almost never invalidate
governmental religious displays,58 so the case turned on the opinions
of Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, who voted to uphold the

53. As in the public funding of religious schools cases, so here does the directness vel non
of the funding seem to make a difference. In Rosenberger, the Court carefully explainedalmost certainly to hold Justice O'Connor's vote, which was necessary to gain a majority-that
the student activities fee, paid to private contractors to print the publications, was different from
general tax funds that went directly to the coffers of the religious group. See id. at 840-42; see
also id.
at 848, 851-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As I suggest in the text above, see supra text
accompanying notes 42-44, this distinction is awfully thin-if government spends general tax
revenue on an array of student publications, why should it matter if the money goes directly to
the student group, targeted for use in the publications, or to the printer of the publications? I
wonder how long this direct/indirect line can withstand the pressure from the
"generality/neutrality" motor at work in the caselaw.
54. For a prior case in this line, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
55. In a third case, Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995), the Rehnquist Court upheld a privately sponsored, unattended display of a cross in a
ten-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding the Ohio statehouse. Id. at 757-58, 770. Key to the
decision was that the plaza was a public forum for speech, administered according to contentneutral time, place, and manner rules. A plurality upheld the display because it was privately
sponsored. See id.at 763-69 (Scalia, J.). A separate group of three Justices, in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor, also upheld the display, but stated that they would examine private displays
in such settings under the endorsement test to ensure that the reasonable observer would not
perceive the display as that of the government. See id at 773-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
56. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
57. Id.at 578.
58. See id.
at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Symbolic recognition ...of religious faith may violate the [Establishment] Clause in
an extreme case .... [T]he permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city
hall [is invalid] ... because such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place
the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a
particular religion.
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menorah, but on narrower grounds. Both applied the endorsement
test. Justice Blackmun reasoned that "both Christmas and Chanukah
are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a
secular status in our society. '59 Justice O'Connor put it this way:
[T]he relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is
whether the city of Pittsburgh's display of the menorah, the
religious symbol of a religious holiday, next to a Christmas
tree and a sign saluting liberty sends a message of government
of
endorsement of Judaism or whether it sends a message
60
pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs.

Her answer: the latter.
In one of the Rehnquist Court's final religion clause cases, Van
Orden v. Perry,61 a plurality of the Court, per Chief Justice
Rehnquist, upheld "the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds. 62 The plurality
deemed the display to be an acknowledgment of the Ten
Commandments' role in U.S. history because of its religious, as well
as secular, significance. 63 Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment,
provided the necessary fifth vote for the outcome. He focused on the
context of the display, "a large park containing 17 monuments and 21
historical markers, all designed to illustrate the 'ideals' of those who
64
settled in Texas and of those who have lived there since that time.',
Moreover, a largely secular group erected the display forty years ago,
and it went unchallenged during those forty years.65 In sum, Justice
Breyer believed that the display was fairly innocuous, part of a larger
setting of monuments (the rest secular) with a secular founding and a
significant history of a lack of divisiveness caused by the display.
Although he did not specifically invoke the endorsement test, his
reasoning was essentially that a reasonable observer would not
conclude that the government endorsed religion with the display.
59. Id.at616.
60. Id.at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
61.

Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).

62. Id.at 2858.
63.

Seeid. at 2861-63.

64. Id.at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
65.

See id.
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These three areas of caselaw are of a piece: 66 the government may
support religion, so long as its support is part of a larger package of
support for the secular as well. The Rehnquist Court upheld cases
involving funding religious schools along with non-religious schools,
providing speech forums for religious as well as non-religious
speech, and displaying religious symbols in a setting in which the
religiosity would be backgrounded to a broader secular context
because, in all of these cases, the government treated religion not as
distinctive, but rather as part of a more general array of points of
view. 67
B. Establishment Clause: UnconstitutionalBecause Religion is
Singled out
The Rehnquist Court (with the Chief Justice joining none of the
opinions discussed in this subsection) invalidated legislation under
the Establishment Clause when the state appeared to favor religion
68
over non-religion or to endorse a religious perspective or message.
The analytic difficulty with most of these cases is that the Court
could have seen religion as part of a larger package, as it did with the
cases discussed in the prior section. 69 Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test, or something very close to it, was dominant in most
of the cases in which the Court invalidated laws under the
Establishment Clause. This test sets the level of generality based on
whether a reasonable observer, familiar with the relevant history (of
the law or practice and of the setting), would view the challenged
governmental action as endorsing religion. 70 The test is about
foregrounding and backgrounding; there is no "natural" or
66. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 169 (discussing the connection between the Zelman and
Rosenberger lines).
67. For a critique of the cases permitting government funding of religious institutions, see
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 346
(2002).
68. Regarding the rule against governmental religious indoctrination, see Koppelman,
supranote 3, at 88; Laycock, supra note 8, at 218-19.
69. See Berg, supra note 6, at 448-51; Gedicks, supra note 44, at 1099-100. But see
Laycock, supra note 8, at 219.

70. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2736-37 (2005); Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. 753, 773-78 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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analytically derivable appropriate level of generality. The caselaw
distinguishes between situations in which the government appears to
be advancing a general, secular endeavor, of which religion is a part,
and situations in which the government appears to be advancing
religion specially. The latter instances are especially troubling when
the dominant religion or religions appear to be using governmental
apparatus to advance their religious messages, viewpoints, or
doctrine.
Let us start with the two school prayer cases. In Lee v. Weisman,7'
the Court invalidated a Providence, Rhode Island, practice of
permitting public school principals to "invite members of the clergy
to offer invocation and benediction prayers as part of the formal
graduation ceremonies for middle schools and for high schools. 72
Four of the members of the majority would not have required proof
of coercion; although they would deem coercion sufficient to
invalidate the prayer practice, 73 they also supported a broader,
jurisdictional rationale,74 suggesting that it is inappropriate for
government to bring religious worship into the public schools. Such a
practice "conveys a message of exclusion to all those who do not
adhere to the favored beliefs. 75 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court and providing the critical fifth vote for the majority, nodded
toward the jurisdictional rationale,76 but focused his argument on
what he saw as illegitimate psychological coercion-psychological
because the students were not required to attend their graduation
ceremonies. 77 Despite the fact that other, secular statements were also
offered at the graduation ceremonies, the Court did not see the state-

71. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
72. Id. at 580.
73. See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (joined by Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.); id. at
609 (Souter, J., concurring) (joined by Stevens & O'Conner, JJ.).
74. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a StructuralRestraint on
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1998); see also Feldman, supra note 67, at 368
(describing the Lockeian roots of the jurisdictional theory).
75. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 631 (Souter, J.,

concurring).
76. See id. at 589.
77. See id at 586 (noting that attendance and participation at the graduation ceremony
"are in a fair and real sense obligatory"); id. at 589-96, 599; see also Abner S. Greene, The
Pledge ofAllegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 451, 451-52,458-63 (1995).
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initiated prayer as part of a larger package of speech activities, but
rather as a distinctive government-sponsored religious activity.
The Court followed Lee in Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe.78 In Santa Fe, the Court confronted a public school district
policy of permitting student-led and -initiated prayer at home football
games. The senior class voted on whether to have such prayer and
selected which student should deliver the prayer. The combination of
local government control over and majority vote to implement the
policy led the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, to declare the
prayer policy unconstitutional. 79 The opinion relied in part on an
endorsement rationale 8° -i.e., that an objective observer would
believe that the school sponsored a religious message, which is
invalid because it sends a message to non-believers that they are not
full members of the political community-and in part on a coercion
rationale-focusing not on coercion to attend the games, but on the
coercive effect on "those present to participate in an act of religious
worship."'8 1 Again, the fact that prayer was only part of what was
communicated from the public address system during the football
games was irrelevant; state-sponsored prayer in this setting
overwhelms any attempt at generalizing, and thus the prayer should
be viewed by itself, rather than as part of a larger package.
Another major Rehnquist Court case invalidating government
advancement of religious doctrine in public schools was Edwards v.
Aguillard.82 The Louisiana Creationism Act forbade "the teaching of
the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by
instruction in 'creation science.' 83 After a close look at the history
behind the legislation, Justice Brennan, writing for a majority,
concluded that there was "no clear secular purpose for the [Act]." 84
Rather, the "preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was
clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
See id at 301-10.
See id at 309-10.
Id. at 312.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
Id. at 581.
Id. at 585.
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created humankind." 5 This is invalid for the same reason that
government-sponsored prayer in public schools is invalid-both
involve the government in fostering religious doctrine or worship,
and therefore both violate a jurisdictional line, at least in the public
school setting. Thus, the fact that Louisiana public schools teach
much that is secular, and therefore that the teaching of creationism
could have been seen as part of a larger package
of government86
Court.
the
to
irrelevant
was
education,
sponsored
The Rehnquist Court twice invalidated government-sponsored
religious symbols. In Allegheny,8 7 the Court invalidated a creche
display placed on the grand staircase of the county courthouse. An
angel was at the apex of the display; no secular figures or decorations
were placed on the staircase. A majority of the Court, with Justice
Blackmun writing, said:
Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or
"promotion," the essential principle remains the same. The
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious
belief or from "making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community.""
The setting of the creche display made this an easy case for the
majority. It noted that "[n]o viewer could reasonably think that [the
creche] occupies this location without the support and approval of the
government., 8 9 In response to Justice Kennedy's dissent, which
referred in part to theistic references in the national motto and the
pledge of allegiance, the Court wrote that "history cannot legitimate
practices that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular
85. Id. at 591; see also id. at 603, 608 (Powell, J., concurring) (focusing on the Act's
advancement of a particular religious belief).
86. A federal district judge recently applied the teachings of cases such as Edwards and its
predecessor, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), in addition to endorsement test cases,
in striking down an effort by the school board in Dover, Pennsylvania, to introduce "intelligent
design" as an alternative to evolution. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d
707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
87. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).

88. Id.at 593-94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
89. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 599-600.
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sect or creed." 90 Here, the absence of generality was critical-if the
creche were in a different location and were part of a larger holiday
display (as in Lynch v. Donnelly91), the reasonable observer would
not perceive the government as singling out religion for praise. In the
school prayer and creationism cases, even though the prayer and
creationism curricula were part of a broader set of governmentsponsored recitations and curricula, the perception of government
endorsement of religion dominated. In the symbols cases, if the
reasonable observer saw the religious symbol as part of a broader set
of secular symbols, there would be no perception of endorsement.
In McCreary County v. ACLU,92 the Court paid close attention to
the history of two prominent Ten Commandments displays in county
courthouses. Whatever one thinks about the connection between the
Ten Commandments and the secular legal tradition, the first four
commandments are expressly religious. 93 Despite the counties'
attempts to surround the displays with copies of other documents
connected to our legal and political history, the Court, per Justice
Souter, held that "reasonable observers have reasonable memories, 9 4
and that such observers would understand that the counties endorsed
the religious aspects of the posted Ten Commandments. 95 Justice
Souter's opinion contains the clearest explanation from the Court to
date as to how the Establishment Clause inquiry into whether the
government acted with an inappropriately predominant religious
purpose is intertwined with the reasonable observer perspective.
[I]n some of the cases in which establishment complaints
failed, savvy officials had disguised their religious intent so

90. Id.at 603.
91.
92.

See Lynch,465 U.S. at671.
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005).

93. See id. at 2728 ("Thou shalt have no other gods before me"; "Thou shalt not make
unto thee any graven images"; "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain";
"Remember the sabbath day, to keep itholy.").
94. Id.at 2737; see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[Tihe
reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and
context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears.").
95. See McCreary, 125 S.Ct. at 2738 ("Where the text is set out, the insistence of the
religious message is hard to avoid in the absence of a context plausibly suggesting a message
going beyond an excuse to promote the religious point of view.").
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cleverly that the objective observer just missed it. But that is
no reason for great constitutional concern. If someone in the
government hides religious motive so well that the "'objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute,"' cannot see it, then without
something more the government does not make a divisive
announcement that in itself amounts to taking religious sides.
A secret motive stirs up no strife and does nothing to make
outsiders of nonadherents ....
In other words, in determining whether Establishment Clause
harm exists, we must examine whether religion is perceived as the
foregrounded, predominant purpose of the governmental action, or
instead as part of a larger, secular background. The harm is the
inability of the non-believers to share in what the dominant group
says is ultimate truth, and the concomitant inability to participate
fully in a government that claims a source of normative authority that
is beyond the ability of the non-believers to grasp, at least from their
different theistic, agnostic, or atheistic stance.
In a 1993 article in the Yale Law Journal, I made an argument
quite similar to Justice Souter's in McCreary:
Requiring that laws have an express secular purpose rather
than merely a plausible one might transform the legislative
process in a way consistent with the dictates of the
Establishment Clause. In some cases, the same laws will be
passed that otherwise would have been passed, but pursuant to
secular rather than religious argument. In other cases, the
unavailability of a strong secular argument will mean that a
law will not be passed. This transformation of the legislative
process will eliminate the Establishment Clause injury of
excluding nonbelievers from meaningful participation in the
political process. That we see so many laws passed on the basis
of secular argumentation, when religious arguments no doubt
are stronger in the souls and minds of many legislators, is
testament not to the fact that the Establishment Clause

96. Id. at 2735 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
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proscription on enacting faith into law will have little realworld effect, but rather to the fact that it is already having such
an effect.
Let me explain why I have not suggested forbidding laws
based on an underlying religious purpose as well as those
based on an expressly religious purpose. One can imagine four
different situations: (1) a law is religious on its face; (2) a law
not facially religious is enacted for an expressly religious
purpose; (3) a law not facially religious is enacted for an
expressly secular purpose that appears to be a pretext for the
real purpose, which is religious; and (4) a law not facially
religious is enacted for an expressly secular purpose that does
not appear pretextual, but the real underlying purpose is
religious. The first three types of law should be invalid under
the Establishment Clause because they foreclose meaningful
political participation by nonbelievers. All three laws are, in
the terminology I am using in this Article, "expressly"
religious. But if religious believers can translate their "true"
religious reasons successfully enough to make it appear to
nonbelievers that the secular reasons are the real ones, then
from the nonbelievers' perspective, their political participation
is meaningful. One might argue that to be consistent, I should
condemn even type (4) laws in principle and then acknowledge
that the judiciary can't enforce this condemnation because the
true reasons behind the laws will be inaccessible to it. But my
Establishment Clause argument does not condemn type (4)
laws. It turns not on the underlying reasons for laws, but rather
on the reasons that are apparent in the political process.
Invalidating type (3) laws will cover all instances in which
believers think they have successfully masked their true
reasons, but have not. If a religious reason can be successfully
translated into a secular one-if a nonbeliever sees the secular
argument as one made in good faith, and finds the ensuing
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with exclusion from
debate meaningful-then the concern
97
eliminated.
is
participation
political
Two additional cases round out the Rehnquist Court's
Establishment Clause invalidations, and they are both unusual. In
Board of Education v. Grumet,98 the state of New York had
established a public school district at the behest of the parents of a
group of handicapped children. The families lived in the Village of
Kiryas Joel, "a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of
a strict form of Judaism." 99 Because Aguilar was still good law at the
time, public funds to educate the handicapped children could not be
used in private religious schools, and the children were doing poorly
in the county schools. 00 So, the state constituted the Village as a
separate public school district; the Village School District then
established a special education program for handicapped children,
and handicapped Hasidic children came to the program from both
inside and outside of the Village. 101 There was no exclusion of other
children by law, and there was no evidence (note that the case was
decided on summary judgment) that the program was run in a
religious fashion. Nonetheless, the Court struck down the law
establishing the school district. Justice Souter, writing for a plurality,
held that the district violated the principle that "a State may not
delegate its civic authority to a group chosen according to a religious
criterion."' 1 2 The odd thing about this holding is that the delegated
power went to the Village, not to the rabbis or synagogues, 10 3 and
there was no evidence in the record that the District was run on
religious terms. 104
97. Greene, PoliticalBalance, supra note 4, at 1622-23 (citations omitted).
98. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
99. Id. at 690.
100. See id. at 692.
101. See id. at 693-94.
102. Id. at 698.

103. Thus the Court should have distinguished, rather than followed, Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), in which state law gave veto power to churches, synagogues,
and schools located within 500 feet of the premises of an applicant for a liquor license. See id
at 117.
104. See Abner S.Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. 1,19-20 (1996).
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A majority of the Court also deemed the District invalid because it
was a special accommodation for a single religious group, and there
was "no assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking a
school district of its own will receive one."' 5 This holding was also
odd because the Court has several times spoken approvingly of sectspecific accommodations, 0 6 because the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence allows "one step at a time" legislative relief, 10 7 and
because a future denial of a school district could be challenged at that
point.' 0 8 Justice Kennedy voted separately to invalidate the District
on the ground that it constituted an act of religious gerrymandering.
He wrote: "In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the
Equal Protection Clause. Just as the government may not segregate
people on account of their race, so too it may not segregate on the
basis of religion."' 0 9 The problem with this argument is that the state
established the District at the behest of a small religious group that
wanted to live separately; it did not separate the group from others
against its will. "0 Despite the difficulties with the holding, "'1Kiryas
Joel stands as a Rehnquist Court Establishment Clause invalidation,
with five votes concerned with the sect-specificity of the state action,
without a clear showing that the state lifted a governmentally
imposed burden on religious practice.
Finally, based on a similar concern about special favoritism for
religion, although here for religion generally rather than for 12a
particular sect, the Court in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock"
invalidated a Texas exemption from sales tax for religious
periodicals. The primary concern of the Court-the majority
consisted of three groups, comprising a total of six Justices-was the
exemption's lack of generality. Justice Brennan, writing for a
plurality of three, held that the exemption "lacks sufficient
105.

Grumet, 512 U.S. at 703; see also id. at 712-18 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment).
106. See Greene, supranote 104, at 78 n.315.
107. See id.
at 61-63.
108. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 722-27 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Greene,
supra note 104, at 60-61.
109. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 728.
110. See Greene, supranote 104, at 27-57.
111. See Berg, supra note 6.
112. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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breadth"; 11 3 Justice White deemed the content-selectivity of the
exemption a violation of the Free Press Clause;11 4 and Justice
Blackmun, writing for two, shared Justice Brennan's concern with
the limited nature of the exemption, what he called the "preferential
support for the communication of religious messages."' 15 Kiryas Joel
and Texas Monthly can both be read as straightforward Establishment
Clause invalidations based on the lack of generality of the benefited
group. The problem with this conclusion is that it rules out all
religion-only accommodations. To combat that notion, Justice
Brennan explained that a religion-only accommodation is permissible
if it either lifts a burden on the free exercise of religion or does not
impose a substantial burden on non-beneficiaries.11 6 The former was
necessary to make sense of Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos," 7 which upheld a religion-only statutory exception from Title
11 8
VII. The latter was necessary to make sense of Zorach v. Clauson,
which upheld a religion-only accommodation for releasing children
early from public school to attend after-school religion classes
elsewhere.
I will not otherwise discuss Zorach, but Amos is an important
Rehnquist Court religion clause case. It would make sense, in terms
of my overall picture, if the Court construed the Free Exercise Clause
to require religion-only exemptions from employment discrimination
laws. However, Amos did not turn on what the Free Exercise Clause
requires; this fact makes the religion-only accommodation upheld in
Amos unusual, and it makes Amos one of the few cases during the
Rehnquist Court era that doesn't fit the pattern of generality versus
specificity. It is an outlier case, but cannot be ignored. Instead, as I
will argue in Part III, it and a few other outlier cases help us better
113. Id. at 14.
114. Seeid at26.
115. Id. at 28.
116. See id at 18 n.8.
117. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). But cf Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is
Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 455-56 (1994) (claiming that RFRA flunked Justice
Brennan's Texas Monthly test).

118. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). For an argument that the accommodation in
Kiryas Joel satisfied Justice Brennan's Texas Monthly test, see Greene, supra note 104, at 76-

82.
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understand how religion is distinctive, and thus how the apparently
consistent doctrine is, in fact, out of whack.
C. Free Exercise Clause: ConstitutionalBecause Not a Targeted
Burden
The most significant Rehnquist Court free exercise case was
Employment Division v. Smith. 119 The question in Smith was whether
Oregon could constitutionally apply its criminal prohibition against
120
possession of a controlled substance to the religious use of a drug.
The Native American Church has a long-established practice of
ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes.
The Court reviewed its Free Exercise Clause cases and concluded
that it had invalidated generally applicable laws that did not target
religion in only two settings-unemployment benefits cases and
cases in which the free exercise claim was packaged with another
claim of constitutional right. 121 The latter cases involved free exercise
claims brought "in conjunction with other constitutional
protections"122-so-called "hybrid" claims-such as free speech or
press or parental rights to direct the education of their children. In the
1 24
123
former cases-Sherbert v. Verner, Thomas v. Review Board,
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,12 5 and Frazee v.
Illinois Department of Employment Security' 26 -- the Court
"invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that conditioned
the availability of benefits upon an applicant's willingness to work
119. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
120. More precisely, the question was whether a State may deny unemployment
compensation to workers fired from a drug rehabilitation organization on the ground that they
had ingested an illegal drug, even though as part of a religious ceremony. See id at 874.
121. See id. at881-85.
122. Id. at 881.
123. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
124. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
125. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
126. Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Frazee was similar in
structure to the prior three cases, but the actual issue before the Court was whether the fact that
Frazee was not a member of an established religious sect was a sufficient reason to distinguish
the other cases. The Court, per Justice White, held unanimously that it was not. See id at 83235.
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under conditions forbidden by his religion." 127 Hobbie and Frazee
were Rehnquist Court decisions. However, these cases may not really
involve generally applicable laws after all; the Smith Court hinted
that it might take such a view by noting that the context of these cases
"lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons
for the relevant conduct."'' 28 In other words, the application of strict
scrutiny in favor of the religious claimants in these cases might best
be understood as a prophylactic device to prevent
29 discrimination
against religious reasons for being unable to work. 1
The Court stated that, apart from these two sets of cases, it had
"never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the
State is free to regulate."' 130 To ask judges on a case-by-case basis to
weigh the government's interest in enforcing a generally applicable
regulatory law against an individual's free exercise claim would be
"courting anarchy," 131 Justice Scalia wrote for the Smith majority. He
added:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance
of all
32
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 1

127. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
128. Id. at 884.
129. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277-82

(1994); Laycock, supra note 8, at 204-05.
130. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. The principal decision that seems inconsistent with this
assertion is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), "invalidating compulsory schoolattendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their
[high-school age] children to school." 494 U.S. at 881 (footnote omitted). As Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Smith pointed out, Yoder expressly held that even regulatory
laws of general applicability must give way to compelling free exercise claims, without limiting
the holding or describing the claim as a "hybrid." ld at 895-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
131. ld. at 888 (majority opinion).
132. ld. at 890.
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Smith is the perfect parallel, in terms of formal neutrality theory,
to the Rehnquist Court cases upholding laws against Establishment
Clause challenge. The focus in those cases was whether the benefit to
religion was part of a larger package that could be described or
reasonably perceived as secular. Just as a law that benefits religion as
part of a more general category of benefits is valid, so is a law that
burdens religion as part of a more general category of burdens.
Three other Rehnquist Court cases are consistent with the general
logic of Smith, although all were decided before it. In O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz,'3 3 the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, refused
to require an exemption from prison regulations that rendered some
prisoners unable to attend weekly religious services. 134 In Hernandez
v. Commissioner,135 the Court, with Justice Marshall writing for the
majority, interpreted certain payments to a church to not qualify as
contributions or gifts for tax deduction purposes, and held that the
law as interpreted violated neither religion clause because it did not
formally differentiate among sects. 136 In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries
v. Board of Equalization,137 the Court, in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, upheld the application of a generally applicable sales and
use tax on the
distribution of religious materials by a religious
138
organization.

The other Rehnquist Court case denying a free exercise claim that
fits with the rest of the caselaw, although somewhat uneasily, is Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass 'n. 139 At issue in Lyng
was the U.S. Forest Service's plan to build a road through a portion
of forest that had "traditionally been used for religious purposes by
members of three American Indian tribes in northwestern
California."' 140 Lyng did not involve a generally applicable law, but
neither did it involve intentional discrimination. The government had
neutral, non-discriminatory reasons for building the road in the
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
See id. at 349-53.
Hemandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
See id. at 695-700.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
See id. at 384-97.
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
Id.at441-42.
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specific location, and Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
focused on the difficulties that would ensue were the Court to subject
governmental land use decisions to case-by-case Free Exercise

Clause scrutiny. 141

D. Free Exercise Clause. UnconstitutionalBecause a Targeted
Burden
In addition to the Rehnquist Court cases that continued the
Warren and Burger Courts' solicitude towards unemployment
compensation claimants--cases that are best understood as protection
against religious discrimination that can occur in a system of case-bycase determinations as to the validity of an unemployment
compensation claim-the Rehnquist Court decided one significant
case involving targeted religious discrimination. The City of Hialeah,
Florida, enacted a set of ordinances and exemptions that could only
be understood to be directed at the Santeria practice of religious
animal sacrifice. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,142 the Court unanimously invalidated these ordinances, with
Justice Kennedy writing for a majority for almost the entire
opinion. 143 The Court reasoned that the Hialeah ordinances lacked the
generality and neutrality required to avoid strict Free Exercise Clause
scrutiny, and easily concluded that the ordinances flunked this
standard of review. Although joining much of the majority opinion
and concurring in the result, Justice Souter-who was not on the
Court when it decided Smith-wrote a long opinion suggesting that
"the Court should reexamine the rule Smith declared." 144 Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, also wrote separately to
declare his continued opposition to the Smith rule barring stepped-up

141.
142.

See id.at45 1-53.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

143. Only Justice Stevens joined the portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion that examined
specific statements of city council members and argued that such evidence pointed to a possible
Equal Protection Clause violation, as well as the violation of free exercise that the entire Court
found. Id at 540-42.
144. Id.at 559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-65 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,dissenting) (calling for the
dissenting) (same); id. at 566 (Breyer, J.,
reexamination of Smith); id. at 565-66 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (same).
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scrutiny to laws of general applicability that burden the free exercise

of religion. 145
III. THE OUTLIER CASES
So, with a few tweaks here and there, the Rehnquist Court religion
clause caselaw is of a piece. Generality versus specificity is criticalreligion benefited or burdened as part of a more general class is
permissible; religion targeted for (or seen as targeted for) a benefit or
burden is impermissible. But three cases don't fit this pattern.
The Court in Amos 146 and Cutter v. Wilkinson 147 upheld statutes
that benefited religion without including religion in a larger class of
beneficiaries. The Court in Locke v. Davey 148 upheld a statute that
disadvantaged religion without including religion in a larger
burdened class. These are outlier cases, at least if one views the
remaining Rehnquist Court religion clause doctrine, as I have, by
focusing on whether the government packages religion within a more
general category of government action. They are explicable only by
understanding, beyond the stated doctrine, the way in which the
religion clauses exert pressure that limits what the government may
do. This point, in turn, will lead me to consider earlier observations
as to why Justices O'Connor and Souter are correct to be concerned
about the exclusionary effect of governmental action that appears to
constitute an attempt at religious indoctrination, and to support their
concomitant (though not explicitly linked) arguments for a broader
conception of free exercise than Smith allows.
In Amos, the Court upheld an exception to Title VII's proscription
against employment discrimination. The exception permits a religious
institution to discriminate in hiring in favor of individuals who share
its religious faith. The plaintiff worked for the Mormon Church for
sixteen years as a building engineer. He was fired because he was not
a member of the Church. A prior version of the exception covered
only the religious activities of religious institutions, and the Court

145.
146.

See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 577-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).

147. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
148.

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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assumed arguendo that the Free Exercise Clause required such an
exception (there was no Supreme Court case directly on point), but
no more. 149 (This latter point clearly fits with Smith-if the
government insisted on applying a general anti-discrimination law to
all employers, religious and otherwise, without exception for
institutions to hire co-worshipers for non-clergy positions, there
would be no strict scrutiny and no Free Exercise Clause violation
under the Smith doctrine.) Nonetheless, even though the statute did
not extend the broader exception to discriminate on the basis of
religion to non-religious institutions, the Court upheld the exception
as applied, reasoning that "it is a significant burden on a religious
organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict
' 150
which of its activities a secular court will consider religious."
Although acknowledging that the Title VII provision at issue
benefited only religious institutions, the Court allowed this because
the government acted "with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation
that burdens the exercise of religion,"1' 51 even though the Free
Exercise Clause does not require such burden-lifting. In sum,
according to Justice White, writing for the majority, there is some
room between the two religion clauses for permissive
accommodation, i.e., for laws that benefit52 religion specially but are
not required by the Free Exercise Clause. 1
Cutter basically followed Amos. Part of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 forbids the government
from imposing a substantial burden on the religious practice of prison
inmates, unless it can satisfy strict scrutiny. 153 Even though the Free
Exercise Clause does not require such an accommodation and the
149. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336.
150. Id.

151.

Id. at 338.

152. See id. at 334 (referring to and quoting from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664

(1970)). For opposition to legislative accommodations of religion, see Eisgruber & Sager, supra
note 117, at 449, 455-56; Eisgruber & Sager, supranote 129; Gedicks, supra note 44, at 1073
n.7, 1106; Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
DiscretionaryAccommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991). For support, see
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Volokh, supra

note 10 (with the understanding that the legislature reserves the power to override judicial
precedent under such accommodation statutes).
153.

See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005).
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accommodation runs to religious, not secular, practice, the Court, per
Justice Ginsburg, once again held that there is a "corridor between
the Religion Clauses." 154 In both the Amos and Cutter settings, the
government created a burden on religious practice (without actually
violating the Free Exercise Clause) by requiring religious
organizations to ignore the religions of those they employ, and by
depriving prisoners of liberty in a way that has a direct impact on the
ability to practice their religion. Thus, in both settings, the
government may lift such burdens-again, even though doing so is
not required by the Free Exercise Clause and even though the
government does not lift similar secular burdens.
Finally, the Court in Davey, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held:
The State of Washington established the Promise Scholarship
Program to assist academically gifted students with
postsecondary education expenses. In accordance with the
State Constitution, students may not use the scholarship at an
institution where they are pursuing a degree in devotional
theology. We hold that such an exclusion from an otherwise
inclusive aid program does not violate the Free Exercise
55
Clause of the First Amendment.'
The first thing to note is that, if Washington wanted to, it could
include students of devotional theology 15 6 in a general post-secondary
scholarship program without violating the Establishment Clause. This
is clear from the caselaw up to and including Zelman, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist said as much in his opinion. 1 57 Second, only
devotional theology is omitted from the otherwise general scholarship
program-thus, religion is singled out for disadvantage. This case is
the inverse of Amos and Cutter. But why didn't the singling out of
devotional theology violate the Free Exercise Clause, as the singling
out of religious practice did in Lukumi? The Court reasoned that the
Washington exclusion "imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions

154. Id. at720.
155. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
156. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 168.
157. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 719.
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on any type of religious service or rite"; 158 i.e., "[t]he State has
merely chosen, not to fund a distinct category of instruction."' 59 This
distinction between a direct penalty and the refusal to fund is not new
to Davey, 60 but it is not terribly satisfying. Would the Court
invalidate a special tax on the study of devotional theology, but
uphold an exception for the study of devotional theology from an
otherwise general scholarship program?
The other difficulty with Davey is how it handled the Rosenberger
caselaw. Recall that in a consistent line of cases, the Court held that if
the government opens a forum for speech-either physical space or
through funding-it may not then exclude religious speech from the
forum. Such exclusion violates the content-neutrality principle of the
Free Speech Clause; further, including religious speech in an open
forum does not violate the Establishment Clause because a
reasonable observer would not think that the government is endorsing
the religious speech, but rather that it is simply opening a forum for
various types of speech. So why did the Washington theology
exclusion not violate the Rosenberger principle? Here is the Court's
entire answer: "[T]he ...Program is not a forum for speech. The
purpose of the ... Program is to assist students from low- and
middle-income families with the cost of postsecondary education, not
to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."' 6' This
would be a straightforward conclusion were the state program one by
which to feed the hungry or tend to the sick. In such a case, the
exclusion of religious programs would not violate the Free Speech
Clause. However, education is all about speech-it's about reading,
writing, speaking, listening, and learning. In fact, many First
Amendment cases discuss the special role of academic institutions in
advancing free speech values, and such cases often give special
protection (albeit often in dicta) to such institutions.162 The Davey
holding limits the advance of the education vouchers movementsuch vouchers, as applied to private, religious schools, are now

158. Id.at 720.
159. Id.at721.
160. See Laycock,supra note 8,at 158, 171, 178, 193,200, 214, 216.

161.

Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3 (quotation and citation omitted).

162.

See Laycock, supranote 8, at 191 and n.221.
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permissible under the Establishment Clause if part of a general
program, but required by neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the
Free Speech Clause.' 63 But it's not clear that the Rosenberger case
164
line and Davey can so easily coexist.
Without suggesting that the Court will overrule the Rosenberger
line of cases (it seems too well-established), consider how Davey
went out of its way to discuss the distinctiveness of religion. The
Court rejected the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clause arguments
through formal maneuvers--e.g., funding denial doesn't equal a
regulatory burden; a scholarship program doesn't assist speech.
However, the Court said more: "training for religious professions and
165
"the subject of
training for secular professions are not fungible";
religion is one in which both the United States and state constitutions
embody distinct views-in favor of free exercise, but opposed to
establishment-that find no counterpart with respect to other callings
or professions"; 166 "early state constitutions saw no problem in
dollars"; 167
explicitly excluding only the ministry from receiving state
168
and "religious instruction is of a different ilk."' These comments
about the distinctiveness of religion suggest that Davey was decided
under pressure from Establishment Clause values-pressure to
protect against religious indoctrination via the government-just as
Amos and Cutter were decided under pressure from Free Exercise
Clause values-pressure to protect against the government's
burdening of private religious practice. That is, these cases suggest
the residual power of a broader conception of religion as distinctive,
beyond those cases in which the Court invalidated state action that
singled out religion for special burden or benefit. This leads me back,
in the next section, to the endorsement test, and to why a reasonable
perception of exclusion matters to an Establishment Clause analysis.
The way in which religion is (properly, in my judgment) treated as
distinctive when excluding it from being the express, predominant
163.

at 172 (noting that Davey's argument was applicable to a program that chooses
Cf id.

to fund private schools, but not if the state funds public schools only).
164. See id. at 194-95.
165. Locke, 540 U.S. at 721.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 723.
168.

Id.
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feature of government action for Establishment Clause purposes-in
cases such as Lee, Santa Fe, Edwards, Allegheny (creche), and
McCreary-means that we should have a more robust Free Exercise
Clause doctrine than Smith allows. The distinctiveness of religionbrought into sharp relief by Amos, Cutter, and Davey-cannot be
sufficiently cashed out by a religion clause doctrine focused on
whether the government's treatment of religion is properly part of a
general package or improperly a targeted benefit or burden.
IV. CONCLUSION
Amos, Cutter, and Davey remind us that religion is distinctive-or
at least is treated as such by our constitutional law-and help show
that a doctrine focused on generality versus specificity cannot fully
capture such distinctiveness. But how, precisely, is religion
distinctive? We can start by taking another look at the public school
prayer cases, the creationism in public schools case, and the cases
involving government sponsorship of religious symbols in which the
religiosity is foregrounded. In each of these cases, the Court
recognized an Establishment Clause harm, but refused to recognize
what would be the precisely parallel secular harm. We do not forbid
public school teachers to lead secular recitations, but we forbid them
to lead prayer; we do not forbid the teaching of evolution in public
schools, but we forbid the teaching of creationism; we allow the
government to sponsor all manner of secular symbols (and even
religious symbols when the religiosity is backgrounded), but we
invalidate government sponsorship of foregrounded religious
symbols. In short, we have a robust commitment to secular
government speech, 169 but an Establishment Clause doctrine that
invalidates many instances of religious government speech. There is a
good reason for this doctrinal divergence. Religion appeals to an
extra-human source of normative authority, and those who don't
share the dominant religion will reasonably believe themselves to be
cut off from access to that ultimate truth and will, accordingly,
reasonably feel excluded from fully participating in government

169. See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000); Abner S.
Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001).
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1 70
when governing is based on express references to such authority.
This is, of course, a disputed matter. Some argue that if religion is
based on faith, it is no more so than many secular beliefs. Others
argue that religion is based just as much on reason as is much secular
belief. I won't go through these debates here. 171 Our doctrine is based
on treating religion as distinctive in Establishment Clause cases, and
the distinction between an appeal to an extra-human authority and
other appeals captures the way in which the Court-particularly
Justices O'Connor and Souter-views the Establishment Clause harm
in these key cases. 7' 2

170. See supra note 4; cf Feldman, supra note 1, at 704 (describing the political process
theory behind the endorsement test: "Courts should overrule democratic enactments concerning
religion when they would have the effect of disadvantaging citizens in their political
participation by rendering their religious affiliation relevant to their political standing.").
Sometimes scholars who do not agree that expressly religious arguments should be treated
differently from secular ones in the lawmaking process nonetheless share my view that religious
belief exists on a different plane from secular belief. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 6, at 18
("I personally incline toward the essentialist explanation, believing that matters of the spirit are
fundamentally outside the sphere of force and coercion, which is the province of the state."); id.
at 24 ("The government cannot be a competent judge of religious truth because there is no
reason to believe that religious understanding has been vouchsafed to the majority, or to any
governmental elite.").
171. See Greene, supra note 1, at 229-32; Greene, Is Religion Special?, supra note 4;
Greene, PoliticalBalance, supra note 4, at 1614-20; see also Esbeck, supra note 74, at 67-68;
Eric A. Posner, The Legal Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEGAL THEORY 33, 35 (1996). But
see Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 763 (1993); Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation:A Reply to ProfessorGreene's
Theory of the Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337; McConnell, supra note 8.
172. Noah Feldman contends that the endorsement test focuses on symbolic diminution of
political equality and the identity of the religious minority, but not on substantive exclusion
from politics. "It is perfectly common," Feldman argues, "for religious majorities to use
substantive values to inform their political choices, and the endorsement test provides no
protection against such an outcome." Feldman, supra note 1, at 712. "[P]olitical self-realization
does not require special protection," he maintains. Id. at 709. You win some and you lose some
in politics, implies Feldman, and if your losses are as a religious minority, that is no different
from losing generally in the political/lawmaking process. My argument that there is a "political
balance" to the religion clauses depends upon precisely the opposite contention: that expressly
religious arguments in the lawmaking process appeal to an extra-human source of normative
authority, rendering them different in kind from expressly secular arguments and producing a
kind of exclusion of religious minorities to which political process theory properly pays
attention. Indeed, my Yale Law Journal piece on this subject begins with the following
observation: if religious arguments may properly play an equal role to secular arguments in the
lawmaking process, then indeed religious "players" win some and lose some, and thus the
predicate for judicially mandated exemptions-that the government may not fully bind those
whose arguments have not been allowed full voice in lawmaking-would disappear. See
Greene, PoliticalBalance, supra note 4, at 1611. What both the purpose prong of the Lemon
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This singling out of religious appeals in the government sector is
not properly matched doctrinally by protecting against governmental
singling out of religion for disfavor. When we-quite properly, in my
judgment-treat religion as distinctive by excluding it from being the
dominant force in the governmental arena, we simultaneously limit
the ability of religious citizens to advance what they believe to be
true. They can do so outside of government, of course, and can even
do so in politics generally. However, they cannot do so if it will result
in a law being seen as expressly and predominantly based on
religious argumentation. 73 This is the lesson of Epperson v.
Arkansas, 174 Edwards,175 Wallace v. Jaffree,176 and, most recently
and most powerfully, McCreary.177 In addition, they cannot do so
through teacher-led religious recitation (i.e., prayer) in public
schools, nor through advancement of their preferred religious
doctrines (e.g., creationism) in such schools. However, reading the
Establishment Clause in this fashion harms religious citizens. We
have properly stripped down the governmental sector from religious
indoctrination. The compensation would be to strip down religious
practice from governmental regulation. Our Establishment Clause
doctrine has limited religious citizens' speech and their input into the
governmental sector, and, by any credible theory of political
legitimacy, we have thus rendered governmental outputs over such
citizens less than fully legitimate. In such a system, the government
can no longer claim that neutral laws of general applicability must be
followed by all. Exemptions for religious citizens-at least as a prima
facie matter-are needed to offset the limits we have placed on

test, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and the endorsement test capture is the way

in which religious majorities use the governmental sector-be it the lawmaking process or the
expressive power of government speech-to foster doctrinal religious arguments, which, I
contend, have no proper place in the governmental sector precisely because non-adherents to
the dominant faith cannot participate equally and fully. See supra note 4.
173. But see Koppelman, supra note 3, at 89, 116 n.100 (focusing on a plausible secular
purpose), 118; Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 40, 42; sources cited in Greene, PoliticalBalance,
supranote 4, at 1620 n.32.
174. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
175. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
176. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
177. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
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religious argument in the lawmaking process and on religious
178
proselytization in our public schools and in government speech.
Smith, therefore, is a mistake. Its focus on generality-upholding
laws of general applicability that only incidentally burden religionis not a proper parallel to upholding laws of general applicability that
only incidentally benefit religion. Rather, because we have limited
the effect of religion on government, we need a doctrine that
compensates by limiting the effect of government on religion.
Elsewhere, I have detailed some objections and responses to this
proposall 7 9-the principal one being that our Establishment Clause
limitation on religious inputs mostly harms adherents to dominant
religions, while it is the adherents to minority religions who are most
in need of exemptions from generally applicable laws, and therefore
that the compensation is mismatched. This argument misses two key
points-first, that our Establishment Clause doctrine prevents even
adherents to minority religions from seeking to use the government to
advance their doctrinal ideas, perhaps through coalitions with larger
groups or perhaps as to items that escape broader majoritarian
attention; and second, that even members of dominant religions might
be burdened by the failure of generally applicable laws to create
accommodations for aspects of religious practice.
The doctrine regarding the religion clauses of the First
Amendment under the Rehnquist Court has a superficial consistency.
At the same time, the development of Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test, primarily in opinions by her and by Justice Souter,
has revealed that the focus on whether the government benefits or
burdens religion as part of a larger class or, rather, in a targeted
fashion, does not properly grasp the way in which the doctrine treats
religion as distinctive, at least for Establishment Clause purposes. We
need a more robust commitment to judicially created exemptions
under the Free Exercise Clause (in tandem with legislatively crafted
accommodations) to offset. the ways in which religious citizens are

178. See supra note 5. For other arguments supporting free exercise exemptions as of right,
see McConnell, supra note 10; David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free
Exercise Exemption: A CriticalAssessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241 (1995). But see Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 117, at 449; Gedicks, supra note 44, at 1073 n.7; William P. Marshall, In
Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308 (1991).

179. See Greene, supra note 1,at 236; Greene, PoliticalBalance, supra note 4, at 1636-39.

2006]

The Apparent Consistency

261

asked to abstain from a full and express use of government to
advance their theological ends.

